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REAPPORTIONMENT IN CALIFORNIA
COUNTIES
William H. Stoffers*
Legislative apportionment constitutes one of the most contro-
versial problems of state and local governments in the United
States. The battle has now moved west into California counties.
Until recently most of this controversy has concerned itself with
judicial opinions on the apportionment of state legislatures. This
controversy reached its climax in Baker v. Carr.'
In Baker the plaintiffs alleged that the Tennessee Apportion-
ment Act of 1901 was unconstitutional and sought an injunction
restricting the defendants from conducting any further elections
under the act. They alleged that the act violated the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution in its disregard of the
apportionment prescribed by the Tennessee state constitution or of
any standard, thereby effecting a gross disproportion of representa-
tion to voting population. Upon appeal the Supreme Court reversed
the judgment and remanded the case to the district court.
The Tennessee constitution required a census every ten years
beginning in 1871 and reapportionment of representatives after
each census. Decennial reapportionment in compliance with the
constitutional scheme was effected by the General Assembly each
decade from 1871 to 1901. However, in the sixty years following
the 1901 apportionment all proposals for reapportionment in both
houses of the General Assembly failed to pass.
Tennessee made no provision for popular initiative, and in
the words of Justice Clark "the majority of the voters have been
caught up in a legislative strait jacket."2
The decision is not one on the merits, but solely on procedure.
Justice Stewart in his concurring opinion explains that the court
does not decide whether a state may weigh the vote of one county
or district more heavily than that in another.8 He states:
The Court today decides three things and no more: (a) that the
court possessed jurisdiction of the subject matter; (b) that a justici-
* A.B., University of California, 1936; LL.B., Oakland College of Law, 1941.
Member, California Bar. County Counsel, Monterey County, California.
1 369 U.S. 186 (1961).
2 Id. at 259
a Id. at 265.
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able cause of action is stated upon which appellants would be entitled
to appropriate relief; and (c) that the appellants have standing to
challenge the Tennessee apportionment statutes.4
If Baker stands for nothing else, it stands for the proposition
that courts may pierce the political thicket and require reappor-
tionment by judicial mandate.
CALIFORNIA SUPERVISORIAL DISTICTS
Each of the fifty-eight California counties is governed by a
board of supervisors. Forty-seven of these counties are general law
counties, i.e., counties governed by general law rather than a char-
ter. This article deals primarily with the election of boards of super-
visors of general law counties.
Our first state constitution, that of 1849, provided for the
establishment by the Legislature of a system of county and town
governments. It authorized the Legislature to provide for the elec-
tion of a board of supervisors in each county. Statutes were adopted
creating boards of supervisors in the various counties.
In 1879 the present constitution was adopted. Section 1 of
article XI provided that the counties were to be recognized as legal
subdivisions of the state. Under section 5 the Legislature was to
provide for the election or appointment of boards of supervisors,
sheriffs, county clerks, district attorneys and other officers.
In 1883 the Legislature adopted chapter 75 to establish a uni-
form system of county and township governments. Section 13 of
the chapter provided for a county board of supervisors consisting of
five members. Section 16 required each board of supervisors to
district its county into five supervisorial districts as nearly equal
in population as possible.
THE CALIFORNIA NEED FOR REAPPORTIONMENT
Pursuant to this legislative direction, the board of supervisors
of each general law county districted its county into supervisorial
districts, presumably nearly equal in population. Many of the
California counties did not again change their district boundaries,
although great population growth occurred. As a result many coun-
ties found their districts to vary greatly in population. A study
conducted in 1960 by the Grass Valley Junior Chamber of Com-
merce revealed that the majority of boards of supervisors in thirty-
4 Ibid.
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five of the forty-seven general law counties was elected by less
than fifty per cent of the counties' registered voters.5 In the writer's
own county of Monterey three supervisorial districts contained less
than twenty per cent of the county's population and registered
voters.
Section 25001 of the California Government Code provides
that the board may change the boundaries of any or all of the
county districts by a two-thirds vote. The section goes on to
require the district to be "as nearly equal in population as may
be. . . ." However, when it establishes boundaries, the board may
consider such factors as: "(a) topography, (b) geography, (c)
cohesiveness, contiguity, integrity, and compactness of territory,
and (d) community of interests of the districts."
Incumbent supervisors have been reluctant to redistrict their
counties. The failure to redistrict has been blamed in part on the
belief that a rural minority needs to be protected, desire of the
board members to maintain themselves in office, apathy, a desire
on the part of a majority of the population of the county that the
status quo be maintained, and the fact that, to redistrict, four of
the five supervisors must concur.
ATTEMPTS TO COMPEL REAPPORTIONMENT
There have been numerous attempts to redistrict the super-
visorial districts of California counties. These efforts may be
divided into three broad categories-judicial action, adoption of
initiative redistricting ordinances, and legislative action.
Judicial Eflorts
The first significant attempt to redistrict supervisorial bounda-
ries by judicial action is found in Peterson v. Board of Supervisors
of San Mateo County.6 In Peterson petitioners sought a writ of
mandate from the superior court to command the board of super-
visors of the county to redistrict. The petition alleged that the five
districts had not been changed since they were established in 1901;
that the population of the county had greatly increased since then;
that the vote of a registered voter in District No. 4 was equal to
14 votes in District No. 2, the vote of a voter of District No. 5
was equal to 19 votes in District No. 2 and 16 votes in District
No. 1. The petition stated that registered voters of District No. 2
5 California Junior Chamber of Commerce, Supervisorial District Representa-
tion Survey (1961).
6 93 Cal. App. 490, 269 Pac. 743 (1928).
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had filed a petition with the County Clerk of San Mateo County
asking that the board of supervisors redistrict the county by ordi-
nance and to change the boundaries of the supervisorial districts
so that they would be as nearly equal in population as possible, in
conformity with section 4029 of the Political Code. The petitioners
claimed that the board unlawfully refused to grant their petition
to redistrict the county.
The board of supervisors filed a demurrer which was sustained.
On appeal the action of the trial court was affirmed. The district
court of appeal decided that nothing in the code imposed a duty
on boards of supervisors to change boundaries of districts because
of inequalities in population. But if a board decided to redistrict,
then it would have to make the district as nearly equal in popula-
tion as possible.' A petition to have the case heard by the California
Supreme Court was denied.
The Peterson rule was followed in Dozier v. Board of Super-
visors.8 Here mandamus was sought to compel the board of super-
visors of Shasta County to redistrict because of inequality in popu-
lation of supervisorial districts.
In affirming the denial of a writ by the trial court, the district
court of appeal questioned the power of the court to compel redis-
tricting. Following Peterson, the court decided that the board of
supervisors had complete discretion to decide whether or not to
redistrict. The court held that the question of equality of repre-
sentation was not one entirely of population.9 Again the supreme
court refused to grant a hearing.
Redistricting by Initiative Ordinance
In 1956 an attempt was made to redistrict Monterey County
by initiative ordinance. After a bitter campaign, redistricting
forces were defeated. The vote: "Yes": 18,165; "No": 24,823.
Some, however, have had more success. Kern County was
redistricted by initiative in 1934; Modoc County, in 1952; and
Nevada County, in 1960. In 1956 the threat to use an initiative to
redistrict Glenn County spurred the board of supervisors to adopt
a modest readjustment of supervisorial boundaries, although the
alteration still permitted "minority rule" on the board.'0
7 Id. at 494, 269 Pac. at 744.
8 130 Cal. App. 746, 20 P.2d 726 (1933).
9 Id. at 747, 20 P.2d at 727.
10 HALL, COUNTY SUPERVISORIAL DISTRICTING IN CALIFORNIA 51 (1961).
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Legislative Action
In the 1961 session of the California Legislature, Assembly
Bill 2100 was introduced. This bill provided that supervisorial
districts in general law counties were not to vary in population more
than twenty-five per cent from the average at the time of adjust-
ment of district boundaries. In other words, no district was to
contain less than fifteen per cent nor more than twenty-five per cent
of a county's population. Boards of supervisors were to redistrict
within four months after the adoption of the bill and by October
of the year following each federal census. If a board failed to act,
a supervisorial redistricting commission made up of certain elected
county officers was to redistrict the county. While the bill passed
the Assembly by a vote of 77-0, it failed in the Senate.
The 1961 Legislature did pass a bill adding section 25009
to the Government Code requiring the appointment of a Citizens
Advisory Committee to study and report on the need, if any, of
supervisorial redistricting.
GRIFFIN v. BOARD OF SUPERvIsoRs
Following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Baker v. Carr, new hope came to those who claimed to be dis-
criminated against by the disparity in population of supervisorial
districts.
Monterey County was an ideal test case for those who wanted
to attempt judicial action. In Monterey County the disparity of
population exceeded 60 to 1. One district contained over fifty
per cent of the county's population, while another contained less
than one per cent.
In September 1962 Allen Griffin, publisher of the Monterey
Peninsula Herald and a leader in the unsuccessful 1956 initiative
attempt, filed with the Monterey County Board of Supervisors
a formal demand that the board redistrict the supervisorial districts
upon a population basis. The demand was based on the precedent
of Baker v. Carr.
The board did not comply with this demand. Early in Janu-
ary 1963 Mr. Griffin filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the
California Supreme Court, declaring that the legal question was:
Is the rationale of the United States Supreme Court decision of
Baker v. Carr applicable to the population malapportionment of the
Monterey County supervisorial districts and are voters invidiously
discriminated against in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment?
In support of his petition Griffin cited Baker v. Carr as holding
1964]
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that invidious discrimination against classes of voters violates the
fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. He dis-
cussed Baker at length, as well as some of the comments on the
case, and rested his case on this decision.
Petitioner alleged that the fact that such invidious discrimi-
nation was being practiced in Monterey reflected no reasonable
policy, but merely an arbitrary and capricious failure of the board
of supervisors to act. The petition stated that the districts were
established in 1886 and had never been changed, though the popula-
tion had so drastically changed that less than 7.3 per cent of the
registered voters of the Monterey County elected a majority of
the board. The voting population, it was alleged, was constituted
so that 8 per cent of the registered voters resided within the 1st
District, 33 per cent resided in the 2d District, 8 per cent resided
in the 3d District, only 1 per cent resided in the 4th District, while
50 per cent resided in the 5th District. The vote of a resident
of the 4th District was worth thirty-six times that of one in the 5th
District.
Petitioner then alleged that he filed a request asking the board
to redistrict and that the board refused to redistrict Monterey
County in violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioner and
the class he represented. He charged that the voters of the 5th
District were invidiously discriminated against and deprived of
their rights to equality of representation under the California and
United States constitutions. He further charged violations of the
equal protection guaranteed under the fourteenth amendment and
condemned the board for bestowing special privileges upon one
class of citizens not granted to others.
Petitioner asserted that the conditions in Monterey constituted
the worst malapportionment existing in California and argued that
the system of "rotten boroughs" should not be allowed. Equality-
the equal worth of human beings-is a basic premise of democratic
American society.
The board of supervisors relied on two defenses: (1) that
section 25001 of the Government Code is a permissive section and
that the Peterson and Dozier cases held that the board of super-
visors had no duty to take any affirmative action; and (2) that
Baker v. Carr was inapplicable to the supervisorial districting of
Monterey County.
In August of 1963 the California Supreme Court filed its
unanimous opinion in Griffin v. Board of Supervisors." The opinion
11 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Monterey County, 60 A.C. 271, 384 P.2d
421, 33 Cal. Rptr. 101 (1963).
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is very brief and general. It makes no mention of Baker v. Carr.
The court ordered issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate di-
recting the Monterey County Board of Supervisors to redistrict
the supervisorial districts within a reasonable time in accordance
with section 25001 of the Government Code. The court retained
jurisdiction to determine whether the writ was complied with and to
take further steps if the board did not show compliance within a
reasonable time.
The court considered Government Code section 25001 and
determined that "under this section apportionment according to
population is the primary goal in redistricting, and the other factors
enumerated may only be given subsidiary effect and cannot warrant
large deviations from equality of population.""2 The court went on
to say that conditions in Monterey County, where one district had
fifty per cent of the electorate and another merely one per cent,
obviously constituted a "drastic deviation" from equality of popu-
lation. The disparity could not be justified by the factors enume-
rated in section 25001.11
In dismissing the board's contention that section 25001 is
merely permissive and not mandatory, the court said:
We cannot agree with the contention that section 25001 by providing
that the board "may" change district boundaries, leaves the matter
of redistricting entirely to the board's discretion and that therefore
the board cannot be required to redistrict however unreasonable its
refusal to do so may be. The section, in setting forth the primary
standard to be applied, uses the mandatory language that the districts
"shall be" as nearly equal in population as may be.14
The court then referred to its ruling in another case where districts
were required to be redistricted periodically to prevent drastic
population differences even where no statute expressly authorized
redistricting.15 In discussing the discretion of the board to redistrict
or not the court said:
Although section 25001 gives a board of supervisors some discretion
in deciding whether redistricting has become necessary to conform to
the standard there set forth, this discretion is not unlimited, and where
there are drastic deviations from equality of population the refusal
to redistrict is an abuse of discretion. 16
The court went on to expressly disapprove the Dozier and Peterson
12 Id. at 274, 384 P.2d at 422-23, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 102-03.
18 Id. at 275, 384 P.2d at 423, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., citing Blotter v. Farrell, 42 Cal. 2d 804, 811, 270 P.2d 481, 485 (1954).
16 Id. at 275, 384 P.2d at 421, 33 Cal. Rptr. at 103.
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cases insofar as they held that the board of supervisors has un-
limited discretion to refuse to redistrict irrespective of how unequal
in population the districts may be."7
The court uses two terms: (1) "large deviation" and (2)
"drastic deviation." The court appears to say that when a board of
supervisors redistricts pursuant to section 25001, the result must
not be a "large deviation" from equality of population; while
section 25001 gives the board some discretion in deciding whether
redistricting is necessary, if there is "drastic deviation" from equal-
ity of population, the board has a duty to redistrict which may be
enforced by a writ of mandate. Will the court refuse to issue a
writ of mandate where the deviation is large, but not drastic?
CONSEQUENCES OF THE GRIFFIN RULE
Following the Griffin decision, redistricting activity occurred
in many of California counties and several suits were filed in
superior courts to force reluctant boards to act.
In Monterey County the board of supervisors in obedience to
the writ of mandate set about redistricting that county. After
several months the board in December 1963 finally adopted a
redistricting ordinance."8
The Griffin decision gave no definite standard as to how great
a deviation from equality of population would be allowed. How
much weight would a board be permitted to give to topography,
geography, cohesiveness, contiguity, integrity, compactness of terri-
tory, and community of interest? The supreme court in the Griffin
case has said that these factors could be given only a subsidiary
effect and that they could not warrant large deviations from
equality of population.
In its redistricting ordinance the board divided Monterey
County into districts having population and registered voter per-
centages as follows:' 9
Population Registered Voters
District No. 1960 1963
1 17.94% 16.53%
2 21.42% 26.00%
3 11.25% 9.26%
4 24.85% 12.05%
5 24.54% 36.16%
17 Ibid.
18 Monterey County, Calif. Ordinance 1329.
19 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Monterey County, 60 A.C. 741, 742, 388
P.2d 888, 889, 36 Cal. Rptr. 616, 617 (1964).
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A majority of the population resided in three districts; in other
words, no two districts contained a majority of the population.
However, the population disparity exceeded 2 to 1 and the voter
registration disparity was almost 4 to 1.
THE NEW ORDINANCE Is TESTED
Immediately following the adoption of the redistricting ordi-
nance by the Monterey County Board of Supervisors, Mr. Griffin
filed a petition for further proceedings with the California Supreme
Court. The court issued an order to show cause, and the matter was
argued before the supreme court on January 8, 1964.
The petitioner, Griffin, contended that the board of super-
visors had not complied with the writ of mandate and that the
deviation of 2 1/5 to 1 was, in fact, a large deviation. In support
he quoted the Supreme Court of Michigan:
When a legislative apportionment provides districts having more than
double the population of others, the constitutional range of discretion
is violated. This is not to say that less than such 2 to 1 ratio is con-
stitutionally good. It is to say only that peril ends and disaster occurs
when that line is crossed.20
In response the board of supervisors argued that it had obeyed
the writ. It pointed out that the three districts with the least popu-
lation had an excess of 50 per cent of the population; that new
District No. 3, while it contained only 11.25 per cent of the county's
population, contained well in excess of 71 per cent of the land area
of the county; that new District No. 4, although it contained al-
most 25 per cent of the county's population, had only about 2 per
cent of the county's land area.
The board pointed out that California boards of supervisors
are unlike other legislative bodies. It argued that while city councils,
state legislatures, and the Federal Congress adopt laws which affect
the entire area within a city, state, or the nation, a board of super-
visors adopts laws affecting only the unincorporated area; that the
county's exercise of its police power (zoning, planning, building,
sanitary, fire and traffic regulations, etc.) applies only to the unin-
corporated area of the county, which area contains for the most part
the lightly populated, rural portion of the county; and that these
factors would justify a greater disparity than 2 to 1.
In oral argument the board urged that to increase the popula-
tion of the 3d District (Salinas Valley), which contained only 11.25
per cent of the population, but 71 per cent of the land area, would
20 Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 183, 116 N.W.2d 350, 355 (1962).
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require taking in a portion of the City of Salinas or of the urban
Monterey Peninsula. Such an extension, it was argued, would mean
a complete disregarding of one or more of the factors mentioned in
Government Code section 25001.
On February 3, 1964, the California Supreme Court filed its
unanimous decision upholding the validity of the Monterey County
ordinance. 2' The court noted that under this ordinance the ratio
between the districts of the highest and lowest population is slightly
more than 2.2 to 1. The petitioner contended that this deviation is
so large that the ordinance did not meet the requirements of either
Government Code section 25001 or the equal protection clause in
the federal constitution. The court, however, pointed out that the
new ordinance brought about a great improvement over the prior
system under which a majority of the population resided in former
District No. 5 and elected only one supervisor, while former Dis-
trict No. 4 with 0.86 per cent of the population also elected one
supervisor. The court stated that under the ordinance a majority
of the members of the board will be elected in districts having a
majority of the population and that the previous ratio between the
districts of highest and lowest population of 61.8 to 1 has been
reduced to 2.2 to 1.
The court decided that the largest district in land area need
not be enlarged to equalize its small population with that of other
districts because "cohesiveness, and community interests are suffi-
cient to warrant the extent to which the ordinance adopted by the
board deviates from equality of population." The court then cau-
tioned:
Each case involving a problem of this type must be considered by it-
self upon the basis of all the facts and circumstances present with
regard to the particular county, and our decision should not be read
as indicating that a disparity of population such as that resulting
from the ordinance will necessarily be sustained in other cases.22
Having decided that the redistricting ordinance complied with
section 25001, the court then treated the petitioner's contention
that the requirements of the equal protection clause of the federal
constitution had not been met. The court pointed out that several
cases involving the apportionment of districts for the election of
state legislators have held that such factors as those listed in section
25001 should be considered to determine whether there has been
a denial of equal protection. The court states that it is obvious that
21 Griffin v. Board of Supervisors of Monterey County, 60 A.C. 741, 388 P.2d
888, 36 Cal. Rptr. 616 (1964).
22 Id. at 745, 388 P.2d at 891, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 619.
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such factors apply with equal force to the apportionment of county
districts insofar as the constitutional guarantee is concerned. 8 In
fact, the court seems to go further when it states:
Moreover, in view of difference between county and state governments,
there are additional considerations applicable to county districting
which can justify a departure from equality of population. County
governments perform a number of important functions for unincor-
porated areas which are ordinarily performed entirely or in large part
by city governments in incorporated areas. 24
The court enumerates several examples of such services performed
by the county government for the unincorporated areas of the
county. Noting that the districts favored in the redistricting ordi-
nance of Monterey County are rural districts, the court holds "that
the disparity in population created by the ordinance does not result
in a denial of equal protection. 25
This latest expression of the supreme court in the Griffin case
sets out some broad guide lines for supervisorial apportionment
both insofar as state law and the equal protection clause of the
federal constitution is concerned. It also draws a significant distinc-
tion between county and state legislatures with respect to the
application of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
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